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__________________________________________________________________
It is easy to think of communication as being primarily to do with the 
transmission of information, with the communication of facts, of intelligence, of 
things people want to know about—a view given scientific expression long ago 
by Shannon and Weaver (1949). The taken-for-granted background to this 
view being the Cartesian assumptions of a mechanical world of separate, 
identifiable, interacting entities in motion according to discoverable laws. 
Everything changes, however, once we switch to a view of communication as 
occurring within a ceaseless, indivisible flow of entwined strands of 
spontaneously responsive, expressive, living, bodily activity—a view adopted 
by all those who see communication as a dialogic activity (e.g., Bakhtin, 1981, 
1986; Gadamer, 1975, 2000; Wittgenstein, 1953, 1980; along with many 
others.) Straightaway we find, instead of facing simply one kind of difficulty in 
life—that of solving problems—we face a second, much more basic difficulty—
that of gaining orientation, of arriving at a sense of what the situation is that 
we find ourselves in, prior to our attempts to act well within it. 
While the facts of the matter are still of importance to us, what is of even 
greater importance is our sensing of the relations between the possibilities for 
action it makes available to us and what, ethically, we feel we must do within it 
if we are to be the kind of person we feel we want to be. What is special about 
our living activities in these situations, is that they work in terms of the ways 
in which our past experiences give rise, within us, to an anticipatory sense of 
our possible next steps—ethical and political issues then enter into this process 
as we try to resolve on a line of action, on an expression of our feelings/
sensings that “does justice” to the uniquely detailed situation we currently 
occupy. While some communications can change us simply in our knowledge, 
others can change us in our very ways of being in the world, in who we are—it 
is the nature of these latter which is central to this keynote address.
Dr. Shotter works internationally as an organizational consultant and doctoral 
examiner. His ongoing reserch interest is in the social conditions conducive to 
people having a voice in the developpment of participatory democracies and 
civil societies. Dr. Shotter’s books include Social Accountability and Selfhood 
(Blackwell, 1984), Conversational Realities: The Construction of Life Through 
Language (Sage, 1993), and most recently Getting It: Withness-Thinking and 
the Dialogical… in Practice (Hampton, 2011).
__________________________________________________________________
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Modern'society'expects'[the'expert]'to'provide'a'substitute'for'past'moral'and'
political'orientations.'Consequently,'the'concept'of'‘praxis’'which'was'
developed'in'the'last'two'centuries'is'an'awful'deformation'of'what'practice'
really'is.'(Gadamer,'1975,'p.'312)
...'because'we'are'studying'not'to'know'what'goodness'is,'but'how'to'become'
good'men,'since'otherwise'it'would'be'useless—we'must'apply'our'minds'to'
the'problem'of'how'our'actions'should'be'performed,'because,'as'we'have'just'
said,'it'is'these'that'actually'determine'our'dispositions.'(Aristotle,'1955,
Ethics,'p.'93)
I’m sitting in a restaurant and, as I look across to someone sitting at another table 
in a certain way, I notice them also looking towards me in a similar manner; at 
that moment, a little ethical and political ‘world’ is created between us. We each 
look toward each other expectantly, with anticipations, some shared, some not, 
arising from what we have already lived through so far in our lives with all the 
others around us. There is a tension ‘in the air’... surely, something next must 
happen? So we look away, neither of us being prepared to initiate that 
‘something’.
Indeed, to put the point more generally, in our meetings, in any living contact 
between any two or more human beings, at least two things of importance occur: 
(1) Yet another, third form of life emerges amongst us, the life of our shared 
expressions, a collective or shared form of life with its own unique character, its 
own unique agency, and its own unique world—within whose terms, for the 
duration of our meeting, we can mean things to each other. And it is within this 
‘world’ that, (2) we can become ‘present’ to each other, at least to a minimal 
extent, as who we are; that is, we can, so to speak, in the course of our meeting, 
begin to ‘see into’ each other’s inner lives. Indeed, if we are to gain this kind of 
sense of another person as having, in relation to us, an ‘inner life of their own,’ 
then, ethically, we cannot confront them as we would a material object, we must 
relate ourselves to them as an other, as a unique, conscious agency.
Relating to a unique Other in this way, is not currently our concern in our more 
academic studies, in which—to the extent that we think of our discipline as “a 
multi-disciplinary area of study” (Fiske, 1990, p. 1)—we try to relate to others in 
a number of ‘one-size-fits-all’ idealized, general terms.
But what, ethically, would be entailed in our relating to others as the unique others 
they are? What would be entailed in our coming to understand them, their life, 
their inner lives, not just in our terms, but in theirs? It seems to entail our entering 
into what we might call an intimate relationship with them, a relationship with its 
own distinctive, qualitative feeling-tone to it, a relationship “more or less outside 
2
Proceedings of the New York State Communication Association, Vol. 2012 [2013], Art. 3
http://docs.rwu.edu/nyscaproceedings/vol2012/iss1/3
the framework of the social hierarchy and social conventions, ‘without rank,’ as it 
were”1 (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 97).
To return to my restaurant example, if it is a stranger with whom we have already 
become a little too involved, we quickly look away again, if we simply want ‘to 
get on with our own lives’ to avoid, as Goffman (1971) puts it, becoming “locked 
together by [various] involvement obligations” (p. 115). And this urge not to be 
too deeply involved with the unique others around us seems to be pervasive in all 
our communication disciplines also: We treat those we study ‘as anonymous 
strangers.’
So this is how I want to begin my explorations here, not with any selected, ideal 
theories or models “to which reality must correspond,” says Wittgenstein (1953, 
no. 131)—but to proceed like William James (1890), in his “study of the mind 
from within” (p. 224).
Methodologically, he begins with what we can notice or attend to from within the 
flowing streams of experience occurring within us as we live out our lives 
amongst the others and othernesses around us. And he then begins to make 
linguistic sense of the particular sensings and feelings he picks out from within 
the stream of thought, not by proposing a set of idealized definitions, but by—as I 
will call it—a method of comparisons, i.e., by continually trying to say what these 
flowing, moving, feelings and sensings are like,2 and why they cannot be easily 
captured in nameable, ‘picture-like’ images: 
Sensorial images are stable psychical facts; we can hold them still 
and look at them as long as we like. These bare images of logical 
movements, on the contrary, are psychic transitions, always on the 
wing, so to speak, and not to be glimpsed except in flight. (1890, p. 
253).
We live, as it were, upon the front edge of an advancing wave-
crest, and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is 
all we cover of the future of our path... Our experience, inter alia, 
is of variations of rate and of direction, and lives in these 
1 “Intimate)speech)is)imbued)with)a)deep)con3idence)in)the)addressee,)in)his)sympathy,)in)the)sensitivity)and)goodwill)of)his)responsive)understanding.)In)this)atmosphere)of)profound)trust,)the)speaker)reveals)his)internal)depths”)(Bakhtin,)1986,)p.)97).
2)This)is)one)of)Wittgenstein’s)(1953))methods)also:)He)introduces)his)illMde3ined)notion)of)“languageMgames”)as)“objects)of)comparison,”)whose)task)is)“to)establish)an)order)in)our)knowledge)of)the)use)of)language:)an)order)with)a)particular)end)in)view;)one)out)of)many)possible)orders;)not)the)order”)(no.131).
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transitions more than in the journey's end. (1912, p. 69, my 
emphasis). 
Ephemeral though they may be, the particular sensings and feelings that we can 
pick out of the stream are not only crucial in our shaping and guiding our 
behaviour, as we move around within our surroundings, but the ways in which we 
make sense of them—i.e., orient towards them—are basic to ‘who’ and ‘what’ we 
take ourselves to be—as well as being crucial also in our trying to answer 
Aristotle’s question as to how, ethically, our actions should be performed.
For as living beings, we cannot not be spontaneously responsive to at least some 
of the diffuse events occurring around us—even if it is in our power, as we shall 
see, to differentiate amongst those still diffuse and yet-to-be determined events. 
And it is in the course of our being spontaneously responsive to events occurring 
around us—events which ‘stop us in our tracks,’ which ‘strike us,’ which ‘catch 
our attention,’ we say—by which, as Vygotsky (1978) puts it, that we as children 
“grow into the intellectual life” (p. 88) of those around us, and come to embody 
the ways of acting and responding that mark us out as being ‘one of us.’ But this 
does not occur just in our early years. As I see it, it is occurring all the time, as we 
take each new step into an uncertain future. For certain feelings and sensings 
occurring within us—as transitory understandings and as action guiding feelings 
(Shotter, 2005)—would seem to be ‘primitive’ or ‘primordial’ in the sense that 
they can operate for us, as Wittgenstein (1981) put it, as “the prototype of a way 
of thinking, not the result of thought” (no. 541)—we find them ‘there’ within 
ourselves as the sense of a unique global ‘something’ prior to all our efforts at 
‘making sense’ of that ‘something.’
It is the nature of these of these ‘somethings’—these richly intermingled of 
speech-entwined activities and activity-entwined ways of speaking—that I see as 
giving a distinctive shape to our ‘identities,’ to our ‘world’ and its ‘horizons,’ and 
to all our inquiries—that I see as occurring before what we, in our textbooks, call 
“communication” and study in our academic disciplines—that I want to try to 
bring into focus in my talk here today. To put it another way, our appropriate use 
of words in our everyday affairs is not arbitrary. Due to the unavoidable, 
spontaneous responsiveness of our living bodies, and our inner sensing of the 
situation in which we are immersed at the very moment of opening our mouths to 
speak, is—or it should be, if it is to be a shared situation (ethics again)—itself an 
organizing agency in structuring our choice of words. Without it, we would all be 
like Humpty-Dumpties in Lewis Carroll’s (1960), Through the Looking Glass and 
What Alice Found There:
“There’s glory for you!” he said, 
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“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’,” Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—till I tell 
you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock down argument for you!’”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock down argument’,” Alice objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, “it 
means what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s 
all.” (pp. 268-269)
To try to use words as we, individually, please—in ways that do not 
spontaneously arouse a specific sensing in others—is to use them in ways which 
need explaining (as Humpty-Dumpty acknowledges), which gives rise to a need 
for interpretation; and the interpretation depends, of course, on the individual 
doing it.  
Indeed, as I see it, as we move into an intrinsically indeterminate, continuously 
changing and developing reality—that is open to an indefinite (or uncountable) 
number of determinations—we find ourselves facing, (1) not just one kind of 
difficulty in life—that of solving problems—but (2) a second much more basic 
difficulty—that of gaining orientation, of arriving at a sense of what the situation 
is that we find ourselves in, prior to all our attempts at solving problems within it. 
This why, I think, as Gadamer (1975) puts it, our turning to experts within a 
particular discipline for their orientations towards moral and political issues, as a 
substitute for our past, more everyday ones, is such a disaster. They, always, are 
oriented towards a single, ideal, instrumental end, a material product of some 
kind. 
This is why, instead of trying to start with theories, or models—or definitions in 
which we try to name what it is we think of ourselves as studying—I want to start, 
like William James (1890) in his famous “The Stream of Thought” chapter, on the 
‘wrong’ side of the Cartesian, subjective/objective split, i.e., on the subjective, 
‘introspective’ side. About the constitution of the stream of thought, he said, it 
consists of 
… signs of direction in thought, of which direction we nevertheless 
have an acutely discriminative sense, though no definite sensorial 
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image [that we could ever give a name to] plays any part in it 
whatsoever. (p. 253) 
It is that acutely discriminative sense of the signs of direction in thought, that I 
want to focus on here. It is the “felt meanings” that the sounding of these words 
arouse in us, as we “grow into” the mental life of those around us, that is crucial 
to our understanding of how communication works.
‘Relational things’: open, unfinished, dynamic unities
So, we turn now to how I would like to look at communication. As something that 
occurs amongst us as living human beings, dialogically-structured communication 
must have a certain withness-feel to it—everyone participating within a stretch of 
‘communicating’ as it is occurring, is partaking of, or sharing in, a ‘something’ 
that is common to all of them. Thus, there is—or, ethically, there ought to be—a 
special feeling of being ‘in touch with a something other-than oneself’ while we 
are communicating: “We are all in this together,” as politicians are currently 
trying to tell us... or at least, we should be.3
It is the nature of these “this’s”—that we all can be in together—and especially 
the dialogical processes of their coming into being, that I want to explore here 
today. For what is special about such events, if they are dialogically structured as 
opposed to a collection of objective, quantifiable events, is that within them, “a 
plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, … with equal 
rights and each with its own world, combine but are not merged in the unity of the 
event” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 6). In other words—words that will become much more 
relevant later—if they are dialogically structured events, they can give rise to a 
felt unity, a felt coherency, within the group of people involved, spontaneously. 
So, although all involved in ‘a situation,’ in the discussion of ‘a topic’ (topos; Gr. 
place) or of ‘an issue’, may each express seemingly disparate facets or aspects of 
it, they will all experience those facets and aspects as relating to the same 
situation, topic or issue, as related to the current circumstance within which they 
are all involved. And further, clearly, rather than a ‘closed’ unity, amenable 
ultimately to a ‘one true’ account of its nature, it is an always still unfinished, or 
“unfinalizable” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 167) unity, ‘open’ to further developmental 
change.
We are dealing here, then, not with objective things or events, but with relational 
or dialogical things, with ‘things’ that have their existence only in the dynamical 
3 Yet)a)lot)of)us—and)I)am)certainly)among)that)‘lot’—don’t)feel)included.)Quite)the)opposite.)I)feel)excluded.)That)withnessMfeel)often)seems)to)be)lacking.)To)speak)for)myself,)at)this)moment)in)history,)I)feel)very)much)forced)to)live)in)a)‘world)reality’,)very)much)not)of)my)making.
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relations between our outgoing activities towards our surroundings, and their 
incoming results. Such ‘relational things’ emerge as a result of “double 
description,” to use Bateson’s (1979) expression, and are of a “different logical 
type” to objective things. They are like our seeing of ‘depth’ in binocular 
perception, or hearing an orchestra ‘in the round,’ so to speak, or seeing a 
‘rainbow’ or the ephemeral ‘interference’ patterns in so-called Moire patterns:   
Such sensed differences—amongst similarities—seem to be crucial, literally, to 
our making sense of events occurring to us in our surroundings. It is our going out 
towards them with certain expectations ‘at the ready,’ so to speak, and our getting 
back specific deviations from them, that enables us to relate uniquely and quite 
precisely to experienced events. It is these shared feelings in shared circumstances
—these socially shared similarities of feeling—which can constitute the pre-
linguistic origins, the paradigms or prototypes in relation to which our more 
organized, conceptual forms of communication can be fashioned.
If this is the case, then our social orders are not based in anything pre-established 
either in individual people or in their particular surroundings, but in these socially 
sustained similarities of feeling we ourselves continually create within the 
intermingling flows of activity in which we are all immersed, in which we are all 
engaged now, here in this conference hall. Thus, if I were to suddenly stop 
speaking and say: “Look, I’m a bit bored by this current topic... Been there, done 
that... Instead of continuing my advertised talk, let me tell about my new Audi A6 
turbo-diesel—wow, it’s really something!” you would have a feeling of: “Huh? 
He’s really lost it,” or: “Why is he saying this? I can’t follow him!”—”I’m not 
with him anymore.”       
Now this feeling of withness, of ‘being in touch with’, is not an esoteric or 
unusual experience. We experience its presence—or its absence—within us all the 
time. We have a continuing acutely discriminative awareness of it: “Are you with 
me,” we say to a friend whom we feel has suddenly stopped being responsive to 
us as we talk to her or him. Oliver Sacks (1985) gives a nice example in his 
account of how Dr. P—the man who, with damage to his visual cortex, mistook 
his wife’s face for a hat—looked, not so much at him, as towards him: “instead of 
looking, gazing, at me, ‘taking me in,’ in the normal way,” says Sacks, he “made 
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sudden strange fixations—on my nose, on my right ear, down to my chin, up to 
my right eye—as if noting (even studying) these individual features, but not 
seeing my whole face, its changing expressions, ‘me’, as a whole” (p. 8). Later, 
Sacks came to think that “he faced me with his ears... but not with his eyes” (p. 8)
—a hypothesis borne out by other later evidences.
Indeed, as soon as I begin an interchange of looks with another person, and I 
sense them as looking toward me in a certain way (as they see me looking toward 
them in a similar way also), a little ethical and political world is created between 
us. We each look toward each other expectantly, with a whole swath of 
anticipations, some shared some not, arising from what we have already lived 
through so far in our lives with all the others around us.
But there is more to it that our merely being “locked together by [the various] 
involvement obligations” existing amongst us.
If we are to live together in productive harmony, more than just our first noticing 
the existence of others around us, with their wants and needs, and opinions and 
beliefs, and then realizing, intellectually, that we must invent (and then honour) 
various moral codes (as ideals), and comply with various obligations, rights, 
duties, and privileges, and so on—as with Hobbes’ and Locke’s “Social 
Contract”—much more is required, and much more is at stake. As T.S. Eliot 
(1934)—in one of the Choruses within his play The Rock—said about those who 
are constantly trying to invent perfectly or ideally just systems of government:
They constantly try to escape
From the darkness outside and within
By dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be 
good.
Our experience of what is required of us in our relationships to others is of a much 
more indeterminate, diffuse kind. Aware of this long ago, William James (1912) 
described it thus: 
... much of our experience comes as an insufficient and consists of 
process and transition. Our fields of experience have no more 
definite boundaries than have our fields of view. Both are fringed 
forever by a PRUH that continuously develops, and that 
continuously supersedes them as life proceeds. The relations, 
generally speaking, are as real here as the terms are. (p. 72)  
It is this more that, of course, I want to discuss further here today.
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The transmission of information
But before doing so, I want to take another tack: John Fiske (1990) in his 
Introduction to Communication Studies, begins by saying that “Communication is 
one of those human activities that everyone recognizes but few can define 
satisfactorily, and that consequently, there is the view that communication is not a 
subject, in the normal academic sense of the word, but is a multi-disciplinary area 
of study” (p. 1, my emphasis). He then says, “to give some coherence to the 
confusion” by basing everything else he has to say upon a set of his own—no 
doubt, reasonable—assumptions, he is going to assume, “all communication 
involves signs and codes. Signs are artefacts or acts that refer to something other 
than themselves; that is, they are signifying constructs. Codes are the systems into 
which signs are organized and which determine how signs may be related to each 
other” (p. 1). 
Thus for Fiske, Shannon and Weaver's (1949) Mathematical Theory of 
Communication model is, “widely accepted as one of the main seeds out of which 
Communication Studies has grown” (Fiske, 1990, p. 6). As engineers working for 
Bell Telephone Labs here in the United States, Shannon and Weaver suggested 
that communication has primarily to do with the transmission of information, with 
the communication of facts, of intelligence, of things people want to know about. 
As such, it consists in the transmission of messages by the use of ‘signs’ 
sequenced according to a ‘code’—and their diagram of a “communication 
channel” is, of course, well known.
And he continues with his definitions as to what can constitute a properly 
disciplined academic study of communication by outlining two major schools: the 
process school and semiotics, where each school interprets the definition of 
communication, as ‘social interaction through messages,’ in its own way: “The 
9
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process school sees a message as that which is transmitted by the communication 
process... [with the actor’s intention] being a crucial factor in deciding what 
constitutes a message…. For semiotics, on the other hand, the message is a 
construction of signs which, through interacting with the receiver, produce 
meanings. The sender, definer as the transmitter of the message, declines in 
importance. The emphasis shifts to the text and how it is ‘read’” (p. 3)—either 
way, the taken-for-granted background to both these views is the Cartesian 
assumptions of, essentially, a mechanical world of separate, identifiable, 
interacting entities in motion according to discoverable laws.4 But what this 
approach does, is to exclude—by fiat, by authoritative pronouncement—all 
relational things; only separately existing, nameable, and thus countable things 
can be subjected to our studies.5
I am using Fiske’s focus on communication as information transmission here, not 
because I want to be critical just of that model, while thinking that others might be 
more appropriate. But to use it as an exemplar in being critical of all approaches 
that try to bring some “coherence to the confusion”—as Fiske (1990) claims—by 
trying to impose RXU own particular ‘systematic order of things’ upon a whole set 
of otherwise, qualitatively distinct, relational happenings that already possess a 
partial ordering of their own. If they did not, if the speaking of the word 
‘communication’ did not arouse in us a precise, but not yet fully specified sense of 
a ‘something’ that could not easily be designated by any other word, we would be 
continually bewildering each other every time we opened our mouths to utter the 
word. Rather than bringing coherence to the confusion, such imposed definitions 
contribute to its increase.
Without our already possessing a knowledge of how, in our daily practices, to use 
the word (and many other such words, designating relational things), our daily 
communicating with each other would be impossible. There is, thus, a radical 
difference between giving or imposing a coherence on what we find, in our 
reflections upon it, to be confusing, and finding a coherence, in the course of a 
4 In)describing)his)new)approach)to)making)sense)of)our)world,)Descartes)(1968/1637))outlined)it)as)follows:)“In)order)to)put)these)new)truths)in)a)less)crude)light)and)to)be)able)to)say)more)freely)what)I)think)about)them,)without)being)obliged)to)accept)or)to)refute)what)are)accepted)opinions)among)philosophers)and)theologians,)I)resolved)to)leave)all)these)people)to)their)disputes,)and)to)speak)only)of)what)would)happen)in)a)new)world,)if)God)were)to)create,)somewhere)in)imaginary)space,)enough)matter)to)compose)it,)and)if)he)were)to)agitate)diversely)and)confusedly)the)different)parts)of)this)matter,)so)that)he)created)a)chaos)as)disordered)as)the)poets)could)ever)imagine,)and)afterwards)did)no)more)than)to)lend)his)usual)preserving)action)to)nature,)and)to)let)her)act)according)to)his)established)laws”)(p.)62,)my)emphasis).
5 But)as)Einstein)is)reputed)to)have)remarked:)“Everything)that)can)be)counted)does)not)necessarily)count;)everything)that)counts)cannot)necessarily)be)counted.”
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dialogically conducted investigation of what, in our everyday practices, is not at 
all confusing to us.
Indeed, claims of this kind reverse—among, as we shall find, many other great 
reversals—the relation between our theories and concepts and their ‘grounding,’ 
‘footing,’ or ‘original soil’ in our sensings and feelings. It is, in the view I am 
pursuing here, to impose a particular ‘systematic order of things’ on an otherwise 
qualitatively unique, multi-dimensional, relational whole that already has its own 
partial ordering, and is in fact still capable of being ordered in an inexhaustible 
number of different ways. What happens if we do this, is that the rest of this larger 
flow of activity within which we are all still immersed, and from within which 
what we attend to within it draws its character, is ignored.
Thus, what is lost in this reversal—in substituting our own supposedly discovered 
‘codes’ and ‘signs’ signifying ‘describable meanings,’ for the real thing—is the 
living words of a living speaker that can occasion within us the ‘felt’ withness, or 
in-touchness, that can occur between ourselves and the speaker, and perhaps, the 
spoken of, a resonance between ourselves and the world. Presented to us as an 
array only of ‘coded signs’—as in a PowerPoint presentation that we (and often 
the presenter) are meant to ‘read’ and ‘interpret’—the essential character of 
communication remains, in fact, hidden from us. Rather than presenters speaking 
to us in ‘their own voice’, they try to transmit information to us in their 
presentations—as if we are always in need of more than we already have.
But when we are ‘touched’ or ‘moved’ by a spoken voice, we can begin to 
undergo a bodily and emotional transformation: to be asked a question;6 to be 
insulted; to be caught in an error or a lie; to hear unexpectedly that a loved one 
has been injured or died, is to feel the arousal within oneself of a tense 
‘something,’ distinctly and vividly, even before we are able to understand exactly 
what it is that has happened.
Substitute orientations: failing to ‘do justice’ to phenomena
Everything changes, however, once we switch to a view of communication as 
occurring within a ceaseless, indivisible flow of entwined strands of 
spontaneously responsive, expressive, living, bodily activity—a view adopted by 
all those who see communication as a dialogic activity (e.g. Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; 
6)For)instance,)in)our)sense)of)what)an)expected)answer)to)a)question)might)be)like:)A)paradigm)instance)of)the)precision)and)power)of)such)an)expectation)at)work)was)in)the)famous)grilling)on)BBC)TV)on)13)May)1997,)of)Michael)Howard,)then)Home)Secretary)in)the)current)government)by)a)Jeremy)Paxman,)in)which)he)asked)Mr)Howard)the)same)question)12)times.)The)audience)could)hear)him)quite)clearly)failing)to)answer)that)question)12)times.)
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Gadamer, 1975, 2000; Wittgenstein, 1953, 1980; along with many others). For we 
move into, not so much an ill-defined reality, as an intrinsically indeterminate 
one; a continuously changing and developing reality that is open to an indefinite 
(or uncountable) number of determinations. And straightaway we find ourselves 
facing, as I mentioned above, instead of one kind of difficulty in life—that of 
solving problems—we are facing a second, much more basic difficulty—that of 
gaining orientation, of arriving at a sense of what the situation is that we find 
ourselves in, prior to all our attempts at solving problems within it. It is in this 
kind of flowing, indeterminate, still developing reality that we face Aristotle’s 
task: that of acting for the good within it—a task that seems somewhat 
unintelligible within the Cartesian world only of already existing objective things.
While what we might call ‘the facts of the matter’ are still of importance to us, 
irrespective of whatever ‘the situation’ we happen to be ‘in’, what is of even 
greater importance is our sensing of the relations between the possibilities for 
action it makes available to us, and what, ethically, we feel we must do within it, 
if we are to be the kind of person within it we feel we ought to be. How can we 
apply our minds to Aristotle’s question of how our actions should be performed if 
we are to be good people?
As I have already mentioned, what is special about our living activities is that, on 
the basis of our past experiences, they work within us to give rise to an 
anticipatory sense of our what our possible next steps might be. But, to the extent 
the situation we are in is indeterminate—and is open to a range of determinations, 
but not just to any—it is up to us, individually, in relation to our acutely 
discriminative sense of its nature, to arrive at a way of expressing its nature that 
both relates us to it, and to the others around us, appropriately. Thus, as we try to 
resolve on an appropriate expression of the feelings or sensings that it arouses 
within us, we cannot escape the responsibility, in our inner dialogues—as we 
stumble around in trying to ‘find the right words’—of ‘doing justice’ to the 
uniquely detailed situation we are currently sharing with those others around us. 
The ethical and political issues that inevitably emerge within this process are 
there, even when not actually confronted by another person.
I’m sorry to have to say this, but I think information-theory based formulations of 
the communication process are unethical, in that they fail to ‘do justice’ to what 
communication really is.7
7 “(Our)only)task)is)to)be)just.)That)is,)we)must)point)out)and)resolve)the)injustices)of)philosophy,)and)not)posit)new)parties—and)creeds)”)(Wittgenstein,)1993,)p,181).
12
Proceedings of the New York State Communication Association, Vol. 2012 [2013], Art. 3
http://docs.rwu.edu/nyscaproceedings/vol2012/iss1/3
In trying, as Gadamer (1975) puts it, “to provide a substitute for past moral and 
political orientations... the concept of ‘praxis’ which was developed in the last 
two centuries is an awful deformation of what practice really is” (p. 312, my 
emphases). It is awful, not because it ultimately fails to help us in effectively 
solving various problems, but because it has (mis)led many of us, especially in 
our more professionalized practices, to adopt an objective, quantitative attitude 
towards other people as a supposedly rational substitute for our more ordinary, 
everyday ways of relating ourselves to others and othernesses around us. This has 
resulted in us (mis)leading ourselves further, into treating essentially relational 
entities as if they are already separated, or potentially separable and thus 
countable things, possessing everything to do with their experienced character as 
being, of necessity, located wholly within themselves.
If we are to get to know what we are doing in the course of our doing it—
Aristotle’s concept of praxis—then we need to turn James’ acutely discriminative 
awareness toward our gaining a sense of how our actions are playing into the 
larger relational context within which they are occurring.
To have a world means to have an orientation
The trouble that we are in at the moment—if what I have been trying to make 
visible above is the case—is that we have allowed ourselves to become wrongly 
oriented. Although it is believed that a technical expertise is always something 
that supplies benefits to the whole of society, the assumption that it will supply 
yet further benefits to us all, if it is applied in determining the character of our 
everyday relationships to each other is, to put it mildly, a ‘lunatic’ or ‘crackpot’ 
idea. For, while some of the communications directed towards us can change us 
simply in our knowledge, others—that influence our orientations—can change us 
in our very ways of being in the world, in how we express ourselves as being in 
our ways of orienting or relating to the others and othernesses around us.
I was worried long ago about the, then, long term consequences of the implicit 
mechanistic and other inhuman attitudes expressed in much of our behavioural 
sciences research (Shotter, 1975, 1980). Now, I think I am beginning to see some 
of the consequences of these attitudes being played out in reality. I do not think it 
is a mere happenstance that we are now, everywhere, seeing divided counties, a 
divided world, and divided, incoherent thoughts as to what we might do for the 
best in trying to act within such a fragmented world.
To have a world means to have an orientation (Verhalten—attitude) 
towards it. To have an orientation towards the world, however, 
means to keep oneself so free from what one encounters of the 
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world that one is able to present it to oneself as it is. This capacity 
is at once to have a world and to have language. The concept of 
world is thus opposed to the concept of environment, which all 
living beings in the world possess. (Gadamer, 2000, p. 433)
It is as it is for us because, as we go out, expectantly, towards it, we find 
ourselves, to a degree, ‘attuned’ to the others and othernesses that we meet. We 
‘resonate’ to it, or ‘feel in touch with’ certain aspects we experience as occurring 
within it, while failing to resonate to others. Thus it is within our living contacts 
with the others or othernesses in our surroundings, that our mere surroundings, as 
an environment, are transformed into “a world” for us—or at least, into a partially  
shared world that we sense ourselves as being in along with the others and 
othernesses around us, a world which is dependent upon them, both for its initial 
coming into being, and for their help in sustaining it in existence.
Due, however, to its partial, still unfinalized, ‘open’ nature, an ineradicable ethics 
and politics is at work. Each step forward can be opposed by others, in terms of 
what they ‘see it’ as meaning. But more than it having just a local ethics and 
politics to it, besides our having particular expectations as to how the others 
immediately around us are likely to treat us, our partially shared world has also, 
we feel, a deeper level to it. It has a unique culture, and it is this that determines 
how they should treat us. The ethics and politics of the dialogical are such that: to 
be me, I need you to allow me, and to afford me, to be me.
Thus for each of us, what we call ‘our culture’ presents a ‘world’ to us as it is, 
and, as such, it contains a certain set of interconnected things, with certain values 
to them in relation to which we take on a certain character, and toward which we 
take a certain stance; it also ‘informs’ us of our rights, duties, privileges and 
obligations in relation to the significant others around us in my ‘world’: I am a 
bus driver with a responsibility for all my passengers, while having to drive in 
accord with a time-table; I am a bridge-building engineer attempting to span a 
kilometer wide, 500 meter deep chasm; a psychologist surrounded by people who 
require the kind of help I can offer them; an architect worrying about both the 
efficient and exciting use of space; a mathematician surrounded by other 
mathematicians, a painter surrounded by the world of art, a musician, a student of 
history, a construction worker, and so on. Along with all of these features, my 
world also has a particular ‘horizon’ to it—in that not everything in it is actually 
‘visible’ to me at the moment, although I can entertain a reasonable expectation 
that at some time in the future it will be—further, I can order ‘my world’ at any 
one moment perspectivally in relation to what I take to be the ‘point’ (on the 
horizon of my current landscape of action) constituting the ‘end in view’ of my 
current action (intention, aim).
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If this is so, then at work in structuring our activities within our cultures are 
‘relational somethings’ which cannot be objectively seen and described, but which 
we cannot avoid experiencing; we can call these invisible ‘relational somethings’ 
that nonetheless shape our lives, traditions (Gadamer, 2000). Indeed, in working 
within an academic tradition, whether we like it or not, we are continually running 
up against others calling our actions into question, continually feeling ourselves as 
inadequate to the tasks before us, as having always to step out, if not into a 
morally hazardous unknown, certainly a political one: “This is what is to be 
experienced,” says Gadamer (2000). “But tradition is not simply a process that 
experience teaches us to know and govern; it is language—i.e., it expresses itself 
like a Thou. A Thou is not an object; it relates itself to us... For tradition is a 
genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to it, as does the I with a Thou ... the 
Thou is not an object but is in relationship with us” (p. 358) In other words, in 
being like a Thou, we find it makes ‘demands’ and ‘claims’ upon us, as well as 
arousing ‘fears’ or ‘anxieties’ within us if we fail to meet—or consider 
transgressing—what ‘it’ requires of us.
If this is so, the major organizing influence at work in shaping our activities in the 
world is not based in anything pre-established, either in human beings or in their 
surroundings, but in socially shared identities of feeling they themselves create 
within the flows of activity occurring between them, within them, and around 
them. Vico (1744/1968) called these identities “sensory topics”: (1) “topics” 
because they can give rise to “commonplaces,” i.e., to shareable  moments within 
a flow of social activity which afford common reference, and (2) “sensory” 
because they are moments in which shared feelings for already shared 
circumstances are created. It is these, he claims, as a sensus communis (common 
sense), that constitute the pre-linguistic origins of a social order; they are the 
paradigms or prototypical forms of expressions from which more conceptually 
organized forms of communication may be derived.
And this, of course, is why we are hardly conscious of what our individual actions 
are doing to us, collectively, as we act them out amongst us within our lives 
together; this is why we do not, as in our actions in relation to physical objects, 
run up against more immediate resistences to them; and this is why it is so hard to 
change them, as a change of who, in fact, we are to, and in, ourselves is involved. 
Such changes are thus deep changes indeed. Yet, on occasions, they are sorely 
needed.
In describing what he saw as occurring as a result of our not being able to trust in 
such a felt sensus communis—consisting in a set of shared identities of feeling as 
a basis for our living together harmoniously, and our feeling instead that a best 
basis needed to be found in ‘winner takes all’ arguments—Vico (1744/1968) 
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described the outcome as leading to our becoming more inhuman in a second 
‘barbarism of reflection’ than we were in a first ‘barbarism of sense’:
For the latter displayed a generous savagery, against which one 
could defend oneself or take flight or be on one’s guard, but the 
former, with a base savagery, under soft words and embraces, plots 
against the life and fortunes of friends and intimates. (para.1106). 
But the phrase which has always grabbed me, is the phrase that expresses that this 
comes about, not from people coming to live separately—quite the opposite. It is 
from the fact that, “no matter how great the throng and press of their bodies, they 
[come to] live like wild beasts in a deep solitude of spirit and will, scarcely any 
two being able to agree since each follows his own pleasure or caprice” (para.
1106). In other words, they come to orient towards each other in all their daily 
affairs in this inhuman manner.
Moving on from where we actually are—relinquishing utopian dreams
Turning now to what all this means for how we can conduct our inquiries into the 
nature of our own human affairs within our academic disciplines, and especially 
in the communication discipline: It means, I think, instead of working in terms of 
what people argue are ideally ‘the best’ ways, ideas, theorizations, or practices—
and seeking to discover in our inquiries what we take to be these pre-existing, 
ideal things—we must accept that we ourselves continually bring such ‘things,’ 
the subject matter of our studies, into existence.
So, although we may continually talk of our understandings as coming into 
existence as a result of our prior ‘thoughts,’ ‘ideas,’ ‘knowledge,’ or ‘deliberate 
plans or decisions’—and that, as a result, it seems perfectly reasonable to seek the 
namable causal processes responsible—the fact is, such processes can only be 
seen as having been at work in people’s performances, after they have been 
completed.8
As I see it, this is the case with many more of our named topics of study in the 
behavioural sciences and communication disciplines: what are in fact outcomes of 
a person’s actions, after those actions have been performed, are taken as 
components of the overall process within which they are produced, and as a 
result, the theories, models, etc., that we produce are, to put it academically, after 
the fact, and beside the point—they set us ‘looking backwards,’ and ‘repeating the 
8 William)James)(1890))understood)this)point)very)well—this)reversal)in)which)the)products)of)a)process)are)used)in)trying)to)describe)the)nature)of)the)process)itself—and)he)called)it)“The)Psychologist’s)Fallacy”)(p.)196).
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past’ as if the indeterminate future we now face was already determined. Indeed, 
as ‘nameable things’ they are often, in fact, foreshadowed in the very ways in 
which, prior to our investigations, we commit ourselves to a particular way or 
ways of looking into the phenomena before us. Thus, as I see it, ‘something else’ 
altogether guides us in the performance of our actions than the nameable things 
whose nature we seek to discover in our inquiries. So how can we proceed?
I would like to bring my exploration of some of the ethical issues intrinsic to the 
very study of communication to a close here, by returning to where I began: with 
the basing of our studies in the acutely discriminative sense that we can have of 
the qualitative nature of people’s sensings and feelings. We can begin, both with 
our own sensings, and with our noticing the spontaneous expressions of others as 
they respond to events occurring to them in their surroundings.
Someone who has been very clear about the need to adopt such a method—a 
method that he, in fact, calls a method of comparisons, in which we articulate 
what an experienced phenomenon is like—is Amatya Sen (2009) in his book, The 
Idea of Justice. He begins it by quoting Charles Dickens’s who, in Great 
Expectations, put these words into the mouth of the grown up Pip where he is 
recollecting a humiliating encounter with his sister, Estella: “In the little world in 
which children have their existence, there is nothing so finely perceived and 
finely felt, as injustice” (p. vii). In other words, he wants to begin his inquiries, 
not by asking what a perfectly just society would look like, but from our felt 
sensing of a something being unjust, from our disquiets, from our feelings of 
things being not quite right.
Why? Because: “What moves us, reasonably enough,” he remarks, “is not the 
realization that the world falls short of being completely just—which few of us 
expect—but that there are clearly remediable injustices around us which we want 
to eliminate” (p. vii). Thus, as I suggested above, by situating ourselves within a 
particular practical situation within which we can gain a shared sense—along with 
all the others around us—of a particular injustice at work, there is a real chance of 
us all, working together, arriving at a way of remedying it. For we can all find, in 
such a situation, both a guiding motivation and, as we mentally move about 
within it, ways to bring to light the resources we need to move on from that 
injustice—where the ways we need will involve our theories, to be used, not as 
explanatory devices, but as objects of comparison to help us in coming to a felt 
sense of what the particular injustice in question is like.
So here—if we want to focus on injustices and the ethics at work in our relations 
to each other—we end with a new orientation toward our inquiries in the 
communication discipline,  as compared with it as the transmission of messages 
17
Shotter: KEYNOTE: John Shotter
Published by DOCS@RWU, 2013
within the context of social interaction: a practice-based rather than a theory-
based approach. An approach that does not exclude attention to ‘relational things’ 
like its theory-based cousin. As such, it will give rise to a whole new set of 
expectations, a new horizon of future goals and endeavours. However, unlike its 
more instrumental, theory-based cousin, we will not be able to expect any final 
answers to our general questions. We will never know what actually 
communication is—for our way of proceeding will not be ‘seeing patterns’ out in 
the world, but with ‘sensing similarities’ within our lives together.
This will not mean, however, that we can do away with theory. We will still need 
it. But instead of our arguing with others over which is a best ideal, all our 
theories will find a use—a metaphorical and/or poetic use—in bringing to light 
similarities (and differences) within our task of clarifying what a particular sensed 
injustice is like.
In setting out the possibility of this new orientation for our studies in 
communication in this fashion, I am reminded of how Thomas Kuhn (1962) 
ended his account of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He said: 
We are all deeply accustomed to seeing science as the one 
enterprise that draws constantly nearer to some goal set by nature 
in advance. But need there be any such goal? If we can learn to 
substitute evolution-from-what-we-do-know for evolution-toward-
what-we-wish-to-know, a number of vexing problems may vanish 
in the process. (p. 170)
And this, of course, is what I am proposing here: that we relinquish the still 
unfulfilled—and, as I see it, forever unfulfillable—dream of gaining the very 
general results we desire in our inquiries, and to be content with the limited, 
partial, and situated results we can in fact obtain, which, in the end, will, I 
believe, perhaps surprisingly, turn out to be of far greater practical use and value 
to us.
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